Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management

39 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2006 Last revised: 9 Jan 2013

See all articles by Lev Ratnovski

Lev Ratnovski

International Monetary Fund; European Central Bank, Financial Research Division

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 3, 2013

Abstract

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.

Keywords: Banks, Liquidity Risk, Regulation, Transparency, Basel III

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32

Suggested Citation

Ratnovski, Lev, Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management (January 3, 2013). Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1012287

Lev Ratnovski (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ratnovski.googlepages.com

European Central Bank, Financial Research Division

Germany

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