Capital Market Regimes and Bank Competition in Europe

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, [42, 6],  1073–1092

Posted: 14 Sep 2007 Last revised: 27 Aug 2014

See all articles by Ronald E. Shrieves

Ronald E. Shrieves

University of Tennessee, Knoxville - Department of Finance

Drew Dahl

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Michael F. Spivey

Clemson University - Department of Finance

Date Written: September 2010

Abstract

We hypothesize that national differences in capital market regimes influence competitive outcomes within European banking. Using bank-level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find that equity market development and shareholder protection are related to bank capitalization and that publicly listed independent banks utilize higher equity capitalization than their respective unlisted counterparts. These capital market regime factors also exert a positive influence on bank asset growth and significantly influence banks' allocations of assets between customer lending and wholesale activities. This suggests the existence of complementarities between bank-based and market-based financial systems that previous research has overlooked.

Keywords: international banking, market integration, shareholder protection

JEL Classification: F33, F36, G21, G28, G32, G38

Suggested Citation

Shrieves, Ronald E. and Dahl, Drew and Spivey, Mike, Capital Market Regimes and Bank Competition in Europe (September 2010). Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, [42, 6],  1073–1092, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012633

Ronald E. Shrieves (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee, Knoxville - Department of Finance ( email )

Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

Drew Dahl

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ( email )

P.O. Box 442
St. Louis, MO 63166-0442
United States

Mike Spivey

Clemson University - Department of Finance ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States

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