Predatory Behavior of Governments: The Case of Mass Killing

Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 107-125, April 2008

Posted: 13 Sep 2007 Last revised: 14 Feb 2008

See all articles by Sang Hoo Bae

Sang Hoo Bae

Clark University - Department of Economics

Attiat F. Ott

Clark University - Department of Economics

Abstract

In this paper we seek to answer the question: why governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.

Keywords: Mass killing, Vertical differentiation

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

Bae, Sang Hoo and Ott, Attiat F., Predatory Behavior of Governments: The Case of Mass Killing. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 107-125, April 2008 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012709

Sang Hoo Bae (Contact Author)

Clark University - Department of Economics ( email )

950 Main Street
Worcester, MA 01610
United States

Attiat F. Ott

Clark University - Department of Economics ( email )

950 Main Street
Worcester, MA 01610
United States

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