Predatory Behavior of Governments: The Case of Mass Killing
Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 107-125, April 2008
Posted: 13 Sep 2007 Last revised: 14 Feb 2008
In this paper we seek to answer the question: why governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.
Keywords: Mass killing, Vertical differentiation
JEL Classification: C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation