A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization

Abstract

We propose a theory of legislative organization that centers on the governing responsibilities of legislatures. Many legislative issues are non-discretionary in the sense that considerations besides the pre-existing policy priorities of the lawmakers or parties motivate action. For example, it is easy to predict that Congress would take up children's health insurance this term because the law authorizing the SCHIP program is due to expire. Governing obligations of this kind consume valuable agenda space, giving electorally motivated lawmakers reasons to support structures and routines intended to increase overall legislative productivity. Committees exist to advance this collective goal. We begin by developing a theory that explains how committees are able to overcome the attendant collective action problems first articulated by Mayhew (1974). We then derive predictions concerning who sets the floor agenda, and test them against the predictions of leading partisan and informational theories.

Keywords: Congress, congressional committees, bill success, legislative organization

JEL Classification: D72