Incentive Contracts for Politicians and Binding Election Promises: Reform Ideas for Democracy

3 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2007

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

Although they would yield social benefits, many political projects are not implemented in democracies. The ongoing debate on reforms around the world provides prominent examples: the reform of European labour markets or the reduction plans for greenhouse gases are cases in point. We suggest a number of improvements which would make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its founding values.

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans, Incentive Contracts for Politicians and Binding Election Promises: Reform Ideas for Democracy. Economic Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 87-89, September 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1013700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2007.00761.x

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
304
PlumX Metrics