Impact of Disclosure and Corporate Governance on the Association Between Fair Value Gains and Losses and Stock Returns in the Commercial Banking Industry

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the relations between risk management disclosures, governance, and the market pricing of the fair value gains and losses (FVGL) for US commercial bank holding companies (banks). I find that banks with strong corporate governance disclose more about their risk management practices and that the market pricing of the FVGL increases with the level of disclosure. The disclosure’s effect on the market pricing of the FVGL is more pronounced for banks during periods of crisis, for banks with risky assets, and for banks with poor performance. Further analysis shows that subcategories of disclosure have different roles to play under different risk conditions. Overall, the evidence in this paper suggests that market participants perceive the FVGL of banks with high disclosure and strong corporate governance as more relevant and reliable. One potential interpretation is that disclosure aids market participants in evaluating the quality of the FVGL.

Keywords: Fair values, Disclosures, Governance, Banks, Risk Management

JEL Classification: M41, M45, G34, G12, G10