Interoperability and Foreclosure in the European Microsoft Case

36 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2007

See all articles by Kai-Uwe Kuhn

Kai-Uwe Kuhn

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

John Van Reenen

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Stanford Graduate School of Business; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

In this paper we discuss some of the most important economic issues raised in European Commission vs. Microsoft (2004) concerning the market for work group servers. In our view, the most important economic issues relate to (a) foreclosure incentives and (b) innovation effects of the proposed remedy. We discuss the economic basis for the Commission's claims that Microsoft had incentives to exclude rivals in the work group server market through degrading the interoperability of their server operating systems with Windows. We also examine the impact of compulsory disclosure of information on interoperability and argue that the effects on innovation are not unambiguously negative as Microsoft claim. We conclude with some general implications of the case for anti-trust enforcement in high innovation sectors.

Keywords: Foreclosure, Interoperability, abuse of dominant position, innovation, European Commission

JEL Classification: O3, L1, L4, L12, L41, L86

Suggested Citation

Kuhn, Kai-Uwe and Van Reenen, John Michael, Interoperability and Foreclosure in the European Microsoft Case (August 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1013929 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1013929

Kai-Uwe Kuhn (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

John Michael Van Reenen

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6976 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6848 (Fax)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7240 6740 (Phone)
+44 20 7240 6136 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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