Harmonization of European Private Law: An Economic Analysis
21 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2007
Date Written: September 11, 2007
Abstract
The optimal scope of legal harmonization and the desirable patterns of lawmaking vary according to current legal, social and economic conditions. In this paper we specify a positive and testable hypothesis according to which legal systems respond to exogenous changes in the external environment by adopting varying patterns of lawmaking, thus maximizing the value of legal intervention. The anecdotal historical evidence discussed in this paper is consistent with this hypothesis. Modern codifications are a good piece of evidence to consider, since they were written and enacted in a unitary fashion.
Keywords: Legal Harmonization, Optimal Design of Codes, Legal Change
JEL Classification: K10, K33, D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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