Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement

52 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2007 Last revised: 15 Apr 2008

See all articles by Matthew J. Parlow

Matthew J. Parlow

Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law

Abstract

This paper analyzes the lack of civic engagement in local government decision-making and the problems that result from it. I consider one explanation as viewed through public choice theory: dominant special interest groups capture local governments for their own private interests. Thus, average citizens are not only alienated from their local government, but they also find the barriers to entry into local politics too high for collective action and participation. While at first glance this account seems descriptively accurate, public choice theory has normative limitations in explaining local governments because it fails to recognize these features of the local politics process as problematic (much less to offer any solutions).

Therefore, I argue that we ought to reject this model of local government in favor of a model based on civic republicanism, which does offer a solution to the problem of civic disengagement. Civic republicanism envisions local government substructures that provide meaningful opportunities for stakeholders to deliberate with one another regarding matters facing their community and correspondingly inform the local decision-making process. In this light, this Article explores whether neighborhood councils - new substructures of local government that aim to involve citizens in policy- and decision-making processes - can improve civic engagement.

Keywords: Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, Civic Engagement, Public Participation, Neighborhood Councils, Deliberative Democracy

JEL Classification: H10, H11, H19, H70, H72, H73, H77, H79, R50, R52

Suggested Citation

Parlow, Matthew J., Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement. University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1014513

Matthew J. Parlow (Contact Author)

Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
714.628.2649 (Phone)

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