Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles

Universidad del CEMA Working Paper No. 251

26 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2007

See all articles by Jorge M. Streb

Jorge M. Streb

Universidad del CEMA

Alejandro Saporiti

University of London - Queen Mary

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

From a theoretical viewpoint, political budget cycles (PBC) arise in equilibrium when rational voters are imperfectly informed about the incumbent's competency and the incumbent enjoys discretionary power over the budget. This paper focuses on the second condition, examining how executive discretion is affected by the budgetary process under separation of powers. We specifically model PBC in the composition of government spending. The main result is that effective checks and balances in the budgetary process curb PBC. The institutional features of the executive-legislature bargaining game, namely, the actual agenda-setting authority, the status quo location and the degree of legislative oversight and control of the implementation of the budgetary law, play critical roles for the existence and the size of PBC. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, which show that PBC are more pronounced in developing countries, where there are also less effective checks and balances.

Keywords: Rational political budget cycles, budget composition, separation of powers, checks and balances, budgetary process

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Streb, Jorge Miguel and Saporiti, Alejandro, Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles (November 2003). Universidad del CEMA Working Paper No. 251, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1015147

Jorge Miguel Streb (Contact Author)

Universidad del CEMA ( email )

Av. Cordoba 374
Buenos Aires, CABA
Argentina

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/u/jms/

Alejandro Saporiti

University of London - Queen Mary ( email )

Senate House
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HU
United Kingdom

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