Download This PaperBelief Free Incomplete Information Games
28 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Date Written: September 2007
Abstract
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games
JEL Classification: C79, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
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