19 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2007
What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The Judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity - between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement - to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a "Judge-mediated" sovereign debt restructuring which resolves key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the tasks envisaged for the IMF's stillborn Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. For the future, we discuss how Judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring (together with creditor committees) could complement Collective Action Clauses in sovereign bond contracts.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Miller, Marcus H. and Thomas, Dania, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights. The World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 10, pp. 1491-1509, October 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01059.x
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