Hedge Funds vs. Private Equity Funds as Shareholder Activists - Differences in Value Creation
49 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2007
Date Written: November 2007
This paper analyzes market reactions triggered by announcements that hedge funds and private equity investors purchase large blocks of voting rights. We argue that changes in share-holder's wealth are related to the opportunity, possibility and motivation of being an active blockholder, who successfully reduce agency problems. The investigation is based on a unique data set of German public listed companies and relates their short-term and long-term stock performance to several corporate and market variables. We find positive abnormal returns triggered by an announcement that an active shareholder acquired at least 5% of a company's voting rights. Interestingly, variables proxying for agency costs explain the market reaction for our private equity sample, only. Ownership characteristics provide only poor evidence for explaining the market reaction within our hedge fund sample; although they are important for the private equity sample. Considering the long-term market performance, we observe considerably negative benchmark adjusted buy-and-hold returns for both samples. However, our results indicate a misinterpretation by the capital market regarding a hedge fund's motivations and activities.
Keywords: Abnormal Returns, Corporate Governance, Hedge Fund, Private Equity, Shareholder Activism
JEL Classification: G14, G32, G34, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation