Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913

Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, No. 1

68 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2007 Last revised: 6 May 2020

See all articles by Mark Dincecco

Mark Dincecco

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Date Written: June 26, 2008

Abstract

Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This paper uses a new panel or time-series cross-section (TSCS) data set to perform a two-part statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.

JEL Classification: N23, P48, O16

Suggested Citation

Dincecco, Mark, Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913 (June 26, 2008). Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, No. 1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015781 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1015781

Mark Dincecco (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/umich.edu/dincecco

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