The Dynamics of Partisan Behavior: CPG in the House and in the Districts 1982-2000

44 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2007

See all articles by John Aldrich

John Aldrich

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Michael C. Brady

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Scott de Marchi

Duke University

Ian McDonald

Portland State University

Brendan Nyhan

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

David W. Rohde

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Michael Tofias

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science

Abstract

This study uses congressional district data to explore the relationship between electoral constituencies and legislative behavior. We demonstrate a relationship between conditional party government (CPG) and the fit between members' party affiliation and their districts. This suggests that CPG may be partly driven by members' response to district preferences. As majority party members' districts become increasingly supportive of their party, members may support the delegation of power to their party leadership in order to move outcomes away from the chamber median.

Keywords: conditional party government, CPG, constituency, demographics

Suggested Citation

Aldrich, John and Brady, Michael C. and de Marchi, Scott and McDonald, Ian and Nyhan, Brendan and Rohde, David W. and Tofias, Michael, The Dynamics of Partisan Behavior: CPG in the House and in the Districts 1982-2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1016183

John Aldrich (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-4346 (Phone)

Michael C. Brady

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Scott De Marchi

Duke University ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Ian McDonald

Portland State University ( email )

PO Box 751
Portland, OR 97207
United States

Brendan Nyhan

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

735 South State Street, Weill Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

David W. Rohde

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-7053 (Phone)

Michael Tofias

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 413
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States

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