The Differential Impact on Stockholder Wealth of Various Antitakeover Provisions

Managerial and Decision Economics, (1996).

Posted: 15 Oct 1996

See all articles by James M. Mahoney

James M. Mahoney

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Chamu Sundaramurthy

San Diego State University - College of Business Administration

Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the passage of six types of corporate antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) and stockholder wealth. Our event study from a sample of 381 firms that adopted 486 antitakover provisions in the 1984-1988 period indicates a strongly negative effect on stockholder wealth, supporting the management entrenchment view of antitakover provisions. Moreover, the empirical results of this paper indicate that the market reacts equally negatively to both non-operating provisions that require stockholder approval and to operating provisions that do not require stockholder approval. However, separate analyses of then antitakeover provisions provide some support for the argument that stockholders discriminate between individual provisions.

JEL Classification: G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Mahoney, James M. and Sundaramurthy, Chamu and Mahoney, Joseph T., The Differential Impact on Stockholder Wealth of Various Antitakeover Provisions. Managerial and Decision Economics, (1996).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10164

James M. Mahoney (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

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Chamu Sundaramurthy

San Diego State University - College of Business Administration ( email )

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Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois ( email )

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