To Have a Cake and Eat it Too? Structural Holes' Influence on Status Accumulation and Market Performance in Collaborative Networks

Administrative Science Quarterly, Forthcoming

57 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2007

See all articles by Andrew V. Shipilov

Andrew V. Shipilov

INSEAD

Stan Xiao Li

York University - Schulich School of Business

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the relationship between structural holes in a firm's ego network and firm performance. We argue that the firms need two types of information - about new business opportunities and partner cooperativeness - to pursue, respectively, two types of self-reinforcing performance goals: status accumulation and market performance. Firms' open ego networks facilitate access to information about new business opportunities, which helps them attain status accumulation. However, open ego networks limit access to information about partner cooperativeness, which dampens market performance. Analyses of investment banks acting as advisers for merger and acquisition transactions in the United Kingdom during 1992-2001 provide support for these arguments.

Keywords: Structural Holes, Status Accumulation, Revenue Generation, Strategic Alliances, Firm Performance, Interorganizational Network

Suggested Citation

Shipilov, Andrew V. and Li, Stan X., To Have a Cake and Eat it Too? Structural Holes' Influence on Status Accumulation and Market Performance in Collaborative Networks. Administrative Science Quarterly, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1017079

Andrew V. Shipilov (Contact Author)

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau
France

Stan X. Li

York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

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