Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming

47 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2007  

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

William Heller

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Abstract

We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on ordinary bills - consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.

Keywords: Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Agenda Control, Roll Rates, Legislatures

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and Heller, William and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019032

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

William B. Heller

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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