Limited Commitment Models of the Labor Market
37 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2007
Date Written: October 2007
Abstract
We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labor market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support.
Keywords: labor contracts, self-enforcing contracts, unemployment, business cycle
JEL Classification: E32, J41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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