Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements

WTO Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2007-03

83 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2007

See all articles by Robert Teh

Robert Teh

World Trade Organization (WTO)

Thomas J. Prusa

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick/Piscataway

Michele Budetta

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - DISEIS (Dept. of International, Institutional and Development Economics)

Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

This paper maps the provisions on anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards in seventy-four regional trade agreements. The key concern of the paper is that the elastic and selective nature of trade remedies may lead to more discrimination, with reduced trade remedy actions against RTA partners, but a greater frequency of actions against non-members. The adoption of RTA-specific trade remedy rules increases this risk of discrimination, with trade remedies against RTA members being abolished outright or being subjected to greater discipline. The results of the mappings suggest the need to be vigilant about increased discrimination arising from trade remedy rules in RTAs. A number of RTAs have succeeded in abolishing trade remedies. These RTAs are characterized by a higher share of intra-RTA trade and deeper forms of integration that go beyond the dismantling of border measures. A large number of RTAs have adopted RTA-specific rules that tighten discipline on the application of trade remedies on members. Some anti-dumping provisions increase de minimis volume and dumping margin requirements and shorten the duration for applying anti-dumping duties relative to the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. Safeguard measures can be imposed only during the transition period, have shorter duration periods and require compensation if put in place. RTA provisions on global safeguards require that, under certain conditions, RTA partners be exempted from multilateral safeguard actions. A small number of RTAs give a role to regional institutions to conduct anti-dumping investigations and to review final determinations of national authorities. This may reduce the frequency of anti-dumping initiations and final determinations against RTA members. In the case of CVDs, we are unable to find major innovations in CVD rules and practice by past and present RTAs. A major reason for this may be the absence of commitments in the RTA on meaningful curbs on subsidies.

Keywords: Regional trade agreement, anti-dumping, countervailing duties

JEL Classification: F13, F15, F53

Suggested Citation

Teh, Robert and Prusa, Thomas J. and Budetta, Michele, Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements (September 2007). WTO Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2007-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019414

Robert Teh (Contact Author)

World Trade Organization (WTO) ( email )

154 Rue de Lausanne
CH-1211 Geneva 21
Switzerland

Thomas J. Prusa

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick/Piscataway ( email )

94 Rockafeller Road
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States

Michele Budetta

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - DISEIS (Dept. of International, Institutional and Development Economics) ( email )

Largo Gemelli, 1
Via Necchi 9
Milan, MI 20123
Italy

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