Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation

Center of Economic Policy Research, London, Discussion Paper No. 1487

Posted: 14 Nov 1996

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 1996

Abstract

Plaintiffs have either strong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needs additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney's recommendation. We show that under contingent fees there will generally be excessive litigation. In contrast, an hourly fee implements the efficient amount of litigation.

JEL Classification: D82, K41

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand, Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (August 1996). Center of Economic Policy Research, London, Discussion Paper No. 1487, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10209

Winand Emons (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
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