Bundling and Competition for Slots

35 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2007 Last revised: 27 Apr 2008

See all articles by Doh-Shin Jeon

Doh-Shin Jeon

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze

Date Written: September 2007


We study competition among upstream firms when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products and the downstream has a limited number of slots (or shelf space). In this situation, we study how bundling affects competition for slots. When the downstream has k number of slots, social efficiency requires that it purchases the best k products among all upstream firms' products. We find that under bundling, the outcome is always socially efficient but under individual sale, the outcome is not necessarily efficient. Under individual sale, each upstream firm faces a trade-off between quantity and rent extraction due to the coexistence of the internal competition (i.e. competition among its own products) and the external competition (i.e. competition from other firms' products), which can create inefficiency. On the contrary, bundling removes the internal competition and the external competition among bundles makes it optimal for each upstream firm to sell only the products belonging to the best k. This unambiguous welfare-enhancing effect of bundling is novel.

Keywords: Bundling, Competition among Portfolios, Limited Slots (or Shelf

JEL Classification: D4, K21, L13, L41, L82

Suggested Citation

Jeon, Doh-Shin and Menicucci, Domenico, Bundling and Competition for Slots (September 2007). NET Institute Working Paper No. 07-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1021348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1021348

Doh-Shin Jeon (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
(34) 93 542 16 57 (Phone)
(34) 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze ( email )

via delle pandette 9
Firenze, 50127
+39-055-4374666 (Phone)
+39-055-4374913 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dmd.unifi.it/index.php?loc=personal&id=d.menicucci

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