For Whom the Bell Tolls: Judicial Selection By Election in Latin America

40 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2007

Abstract

One of the most pressing challenges facing Latin America is the inadequacy of judicial services. Judicial reform is considered essential to political and economic stability. It is believed that the judiciary will not only reinforce the rule of law, but will also become the very centerpiece for democracy. The key to a successful judicial reform effort will depend, in part, on strengthening the independence of the judiciary.

This Comment advocates that an elected judiciary, as opposed to the present appointment system, will create a stronger, more independent, and more responsive system in Latin America. It begins by reviewing the current situation in Latin America to ensure that the proposed remedy is a valid strategy for justice and development. It then examines the judiciary's role in an emerging democratic region such as Latin America from a historical perspective. In particular, it considers the experiences of countries in a similar stage of development and analyzes comparative studies of some Latin American countries. It also considers the current practice of judicial selection in the United States of America. It then evaluates judicial selection by election in Latin America and concludes that it will not only contribute to a stronger judiciary, but one that is more closely connected to the people.

Keywords: selection of judges, judicial selection, election of judges, judicial reform, court reform, Latin America

Suggested Citation

Anenson, T. Leigh, For Whom the Bell Tolls: Judicial Selection By Election in Latin America. Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol. 4, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1021360

T. Leigh Anenson (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
440-336-4468 (Phone)

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