The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations

31 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2007

See all articles by Stefan Napel

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2007

Abstract

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.

Keywords: European Commission, investiture procedure, voting rules, Council of Ministers, European Parliament

JEL Classification: C70, D02, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Napel, Stefan and Widgren, Mika T., The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations (October 2007). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2120. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1021959

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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