Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment

36 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2007

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

M. Vittoria Levati

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Strategic Interaction Group

Torsten Weiland

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: August 20, 2007

Abstract

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.

Keywords: Public goods game, Cheap talk communication, Real-time protocol

JEL Classification: C72, H41, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Levati, M. Vittoria and Weiland, Torsten, Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment (August 20, 2007). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-048, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1022036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1022036

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

M. Vittoria Levati (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Strategic Interaction Group ( email )

D-07745 Jena
Germany

Torsten Weiland

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

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