Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note

Carlstrom, Charles T.; Fuerst, Timothy S.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1022093

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Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note

FRB of Cleveland Working Paper No. 06-21

14 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2007

See all articles by Charles T. Carlstrom

Timothy S. Fuerst

University of Notre Dame

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Carlstrom, Charles T. and Fuerst, Timothy S., Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note (December 2006). FRB of Cleveland Working Paper No. 06-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1022093 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1022093