Board Structure, Antitakover Provisions and Stockholder Wealth

Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 3 (1996).

Posted: 25 Nov 1996

See all articles by Chamu Sundaramurthy

Chamu Sundaramurthy

San Diego State University - College of Business Administration

James M. Mahoney

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois

Abstract

This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poision pills) in the 1984-1988 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firm's board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions.

JEL Classification: G12, G34

Suggested Citation

Sundaramurthy, Chamu and Mahoney, James M. and Mahoney, Joseph T., Board Structure, Antitakover Provisions and Stockholder Wealth. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 3 (1996).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10224

Chamu Sundaramurthy

San Diego State University - College of Business Administration ( email )

5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182-8230
United States

James M. Mahoney (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-8910 (Phone)
212-720-1577 (Fax)

Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
339 Commerce West
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-7969 (Phone)
217-244-4102 (Fax)

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