Response Time Under Monetary Incentives: The Ultimatum Game

8 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2007 Last revised: 5 Nov 2007

See all articles by Pablo Brañas-Garza

Pablo Brañas-Garza

Universidad Loyola Andalucia

Ana Leon-Mejia

Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA)

Luis M. Miller

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: September 25, 2007

Abstract

This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with response time, whereas responders' behavior is positively and significantly correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that can be obtained from response times.

Keywords: Monetary incentives, Ultimatum game, response time

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Brañas-Garza, Pablo and Leon-Mejia, Ana and Miller, Luis M., Response Time Under Monetary Incentives: The Ultimatum Game (September 25, 2007). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-070, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1023881

Pablo Brañas-Garza (Contact Author)

Universidad Loyola Andalucia ( email )

c/ Escritor Castilla Aguayo
Córdoba, 14004
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/pablobranasgarza/home

Ana Leon-Mejia

Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) ( email )

C/ Campo Santo de los Mártires, 7
San Bernardo 1010, Caracas, Córdoba 14004
Venezuela

Luis M. Miller

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

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