What Have We Learned from Market Design?

43 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2007 Last revised: 29 Oct 2014

See all articles by Alvin E. Roth

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: October 2007

Abstract

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.

Suggested Citation

Roth, Alvin E., What Have We Learned from Market Design? (October 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13530. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1024134

Alvin E. Roth (Contact Author)

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

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