Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences

74 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2007 Last revised: 8 Sep 2008

See all articles by Holger Daske

Holger Daske

University of Mannheim

Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Leibniz Institute SAFE; CESifo Research Network; Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Rodrigo S. Verdi

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2008

Abstract

This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date. Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting. Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.

Keywords: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity, Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Daske, Holger and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian and Verdi, Rodrigo S., Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences (August 2008). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 198/2008, Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024240

Holger Daske

University of Mannheim ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/daske/

Luzi Hail (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-8205 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-1996 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.leuz/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Leibniz Institute SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

CESifo Research Network

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Rodrigo S. Verdi

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street E62-666
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(617) 253 2956 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
13,957
Abstract Views
67,802
Rank
647
PlumX Metrics