Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior

50 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2007

See all articles by Leo Strine

Leo Strine

University of Pennsylvania Law School; Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz

Date Written: October 15, 2007

Abstract

In this essay, which was delivered as the Torys Lecture at the University of Toronto, Vice Chancellor Strine considers the implications of globalization for the effective regulation of corporate behavior affecting interests other than those of stockholders against the backdrop of the West's political and economic experience. He concludes that consistent with prior experience, the globalization of corporate markets will require a corresponding expansion of the polity to protect those aspects of human freedom that are affected in important ways by corporate behavior. As a practical matter, this means that if the U.S. and other Western nations wish to limit the ability of corporations to generate externalities and impair rights the West has embraced as important to individuals' ability to lead the good life, they will have to give up some of their sovereignty to international institutions in exchange for regulation that is co-extensive with the sphere in which corporations conduct their activities.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Shareholders, Labor, Managers, Globalization, Corporate social responsibility, CSR, Shareholder value, Accountability, Sovereignty, International regulation, Economic liberty, New Deal, Externalities, Regulatory arbitrage, International norms and cooperation

JEL Classification: F23, G30, K22, K33

Suggested Citation

Strine, Leo, Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior (October 15, 2007). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1024506 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024506

Leo Strine (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz ( email )

51 W 52nd St
New York, NY 10019
United States
212-403-1178 (Phone)

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