13 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2007
Date Written: October 2007
There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Broner, Fernando and Martin, Alberto and Ventura, Jaume, Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets (October 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13559. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1024973