Harmful Tax Competition: Defeat or Victory?

Australian Tax Forum, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 3-17, 2007

U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 272

9 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2007

See all articles by Sunita Jogarajan

Sunita Jogarajan

University of Melbourne - Law School

Miranda Stewart

University of Melbourne - Law School; Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy

Abstract

In the late 1990s, the OECD launched its report on Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue. The goal of the OECD was to eliminate or regulate harmful preferentail tax regimes for mobile financial captial, including tax havens. By 2001, the OECD consensus, already shaky as a result of abstention by Switzerland and Luxembourg, was breached by the United States and the OECD backed away from strong sanctions against tax havens. The focus of the OECD project subsquently shifted towards less onerous exchange of information obligations. This reveiw essay discusses recent research into the OECD's attempt at regulating harmful tax competition.

Keywords: OECD, regulation, harmful, tax, competition

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Jogarajan, Sunita and Stewart, Miranda, Harmful Tax Competition: Defeat or Victory?. Australian Tax Forum, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 3-17, 2007; U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 272. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1025773

Sunita Jogarajan (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

Miranda Stewart

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

Melbourne, Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 6544 (Phone)

Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy ( email )

7 Liversidge Street
Lennox Crossing
Canberra, ACT 0200
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://https://crawford.anu.edu.au/people/academic/miranda-stewart

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
371
Abstract Views
1,160
rank
78,424
PlumX Metrics