Robust Learning Stability with Operational Monetary Policy Rules

31 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2007

See all articles by George W. Evans

George W. Evans

University of Oregon - Department of Economics; University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance

Seppo Honkapohja

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Aalto University School of Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Aalto University - School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2007

Abstract

We consider the robust stability of a rational expectations equilibrium, which we define as stability under discounted (constant gain) least-squares learning, for a range of gain parameters. We find that for operational forms of policy rules, ie rules that do not depend on contemporaneous values of endogenous aggregate variables, many interest-rate rules do not exhibit robust stability. We consider a variety of interest-rate rules, including instrument rules, optimal reaction functions under discretion or commitment, and rules that approximate optimal policy under commitment. For some reaction functions we allow for an interest-rate stabilization motive in the policy objective. The expectations-based rules proposed in Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006) deliver robust learning stability. In contrast, many proposed alternatives become unstable under learning even at small values of the gain parameter.

Keywords: Commitment, interest-rate setting, adaptive learning, stability, determinacy.

JEL Classification: E52, E31, D84

Suggested Citation

Evans, George W. and Honkapohja, Seppo and Honkapohja, Seppo, Robust Learning Stability with Operational Monetary Policy Rules (October 2007). CDMA Working Paper No. 07/19, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 31/2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1025884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025884

George W. Evans (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

1285 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-4662 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

The Scores, Castlecliff
St. Andrews, Fife KY16 8RD
United Kingdom
44-1334-462435 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/economics/staff/pages.g.evans.shtml

Seppo Honkapohja

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Aalto University School of Business ( email )

, PO Box 21210
Aalto FI-00076
Finland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Aalto University - School of Business

Finland

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