Climate Policy and Ancillary Benefits - A Survey and Integration into the Modelling of International Negotiations on Climate Change

26 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2007 Last revised: 14 Aug 2009

See all articles by Dirk T. G. Rübbelke

Dirk T. G. Rübbelke

Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg

Karen Pittel

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC)

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.

Keywords: ancillary benefits, climate change, international negotiations, chicken game

JEL Classification: Q54, F51, H41

Suggested Citation

Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. and Pittel, Karen, Climate Policy and Ancillary Benefits - A Survey and Integration into the Modelling of International Negotiations on Climate Change (November 2007). Zentrum Fuer Europaeische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 07/064. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1025905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025905

Dirk T. G. Rübbelke (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg ( email )

Freiberg, 09599
Germany

Karen Pittel

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC) ( email )

ETH-Zentrum
ZUE F18
Zurich, CH-8092

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