The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study

19 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2007

See all articles by Matteo Ploner

Matteo Ploner

University of Trento

Anthony Ziegelmeyer

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics; Queen's University Belfast - Queen's Management School

Date Written: October 30, 2007

Abstract

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the benefits and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.

Keywords: Control, Experimental Economics, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation, Trust

JEL Classification: C91, M52

Suggested Citation

Ploner, Matteo and Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study (October 30, 2007). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-074, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1025965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025965

Matteo Ploner (Contact Author)

University of Trento ( email )

Via Giuseppe Verdi 26
Trento, Trento 38152
Italy

Anthony Ziegelmeyer

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

Queen's University Belfast - Queen's Management School ( email )

Riddel Hall
185 Stranmillis Road
Belfast, BT9 5EE
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
148
Abstract Views
1,358
rank
218,393
PlumX Metrics