The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study
19 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2007
Date Written: October 30, 2007
This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the beneﬁts and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.
Keywords: Control, Experimental Economics, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation, Trust
JEL Classification: C91, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation