Intersubjective Consistency of Knowledge and Belief

University of California, Davis Working Paper #98-03

Posted: 28 Jun 1998

See all articles by Giacomo Bonanno

Giacomo Bonanno

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Date Written: February, 1998

Abstract

We consider interactive epistemic models where individuals are described by both their "knowledge" and their "beliefs." Three intersubjective consistency conditions are examined: Intersubjective Caution (if an individual believes something to be common belief then he knows it to be common belief), Truth of Common Belief (only true facts are commonly believed) and Qualitative Agreement. These conditions are employed in characterizations of the following properties which describe either the extent of intersubjective truth and/or the logic of common belief: common belief in no error, common knowledge of common belief, negative introspection of common belief, coincidence of common knowledge and common belief, and collapse of individual belief and knowledge. We also discuss to what extent the three fundamental conditions can be viewed as intersubjective rationality conditions.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Bonanno, Giacomo F. and Nehring, Klaus, Intersubjective Consistency of Knowledge and Belief (February, 1998). University of California, Davis Working Paper #98-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=102605

Giacomo F. Bonanno (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-1574 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-3379 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

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