Information Gathering by a Principal
34 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2007
Date Written: September 2003
In the standard principal-agent model, the information structure is fixed. In this paper the author allows the principal to choose his level of informedness before he contracts with the agent. During the contracting phase, the agent never learns what the principal knows about the state of the world. This paper examines the cases in which the agent observes and does not observe the level of informedness that the principal chooses. The strategic nature of the model environment implies that there are both direct and indirect costs associated with the existence of high quality information. The implications for information gathering, investment, and welfare are examined for both cases.
Keywords: principal-agent model, efficiency of information acquisition
JEL Classification: D82, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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