Organizational Governance

81 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2007 Last revised: 20 May 2008

See all articles by Nicolai J. Foss

Nicolai J. Foss

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategy and Innovation

Peter G. Klein

Baylor University - Hankamer School of Business; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Strategy and Management; Ludwig von Mises Institute

Date Written: October 30, 2007

Abstract

This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.

Keywords: rational choice, organizational economics, governance structures, governance mechanisms

Suggested Citation

Foss, Nicolai J. and Klein, Peter G., Organizational Governance (October 30, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1026897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1026897

Nicolai J. Foss (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategy and Innovation ( email )

Kilen
Frederiksberg, 2000
Denmark

Peter G. Klein

Baylor University - Hankamer School of Business ( email )

Waco, TX 76798
United States
254-710-4903 (Phone)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Strategy and Management ( email )

Breiviksveien 40
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Ludwig von Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
United States

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