Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 31, pp. 393-413, 2008
20 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2007 Last revised: 29 Aug 2013
Date Written: July 11, 2007
Sen's classic social choice result supposedly demonstrates a conflict between Pareto and even minimal forms of liberalism. By providing the first direct mathematical proof of this seminal result, we underscore a significantly different interpretation: rather than conflicts among rights, Sen's result occurs because the liberalism assumption negates the assumption that voters have transitive preferences. This explanation enriches interpretations of Sen's conclusion by including radically new kinds of societal conflicts, it suggests ways to sidestep these difficulties, and it explains earlier approaches to avoid the difficulties.
Keywords: Sen, Paretian liberal, paradox, decision theory
JEL Classification: D71, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Li, Lingfang (Ivy) and Saari, Donald G., Sen's Theorem: Geometric Proof, New Interpretations (July 11, 2007). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 31, pp. 393-413, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1028364