Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy

48 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2007  

Ulrich J. Wagner

Department of Economics, University of Mannheim

Abstract

International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.

Keywords: international environmental agreements, game theory

JEL Classification: Q2, H41, C72

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Ulrich J., The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 377-411, July 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028782

Ulrich J. Wagner (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Mannheim ( email )

L7, 3-5
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
+49 621 181 1420 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://wagner.vwl.uni-mannheim.de

Paper statistics

Downloads
318
Rank
78,421
Abstract Views
1,287