46 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2008 Last revised: 1 Mar 2011
Date Written: June 7, 2009
We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm's related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. This evidence indicates that securities-market regulation can be effective in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country with weak judicial enforcement. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the new regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where block holders have strong political connections.
Keywords: China, corporate governance, enforcement, expropriation, political connections, investor
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38, G12, G15
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Berkman, Henk and Cole, Rebel A. and Fu, Jiang Lawrence, Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China (June 7, 2009). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Vol. 45, No. 6, pp.1391-1417, 2010; AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1029886