The CEO Pay Slice

55 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2007 Last revised: 12 Jul 2018

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Martijn Cremers

University of Notre Dame

Urs Peyer

INSEAD - Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry adjusted Tobin’s q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms’ behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.

Keywords: Executive compensation, corporate governance, CEOs, executives, options, equity-based compensation, non-equity compensation, Tobin's Q, firm entrenchment, CEO turnover, independent directors, CEO chair, acquisitions, CEO turnover, pay for luck., variability of returns, pay distribution, internal pay

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G38, J33, J44, K22, M14

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Cremers, K. J. Martijn and Peyer, Urs C., The CEO Pay Slice (September 1, 2010). 102 Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 102, 2011, pp. 199-221. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1030107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1030107

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

K. J. Martijn Cremers

University of Notre Dame ( email )

P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States

Urs C. Peyer

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4178 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4045 (Fax)

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