Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law

14 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2007

See all articles by John Yoo

John Yoo

University of California at Berkeley School of Law; American Enterprise Institute; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Glenn Sulmasy

U.S. Coast Guard Academy

Abstract

This essay addresses proposals for international regulation of intelligence gathering activities. We show that international law currently does not express any strong norms against intelligence gathering. We argue that international law is incapable of regulating such activities and proposals for change would prove counterproductive. Careful attention to the causes of war between rational nation-states shows that these efforts will have the highly undesirable result of making war more, rather than less, likely.

Keywords: intelligence, covert activity, terrorism

Suggested Citation

Yoo, John Choon and Sulmasy, Glenn M., Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law. Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 2007; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1030763. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1030763

John Choon Yoo (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-600-3217 (Phone)
510-643-2673 (Fax)

American Enterprise Institute ( email )

1789 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hoover.org/profiles/john-yoo

Glenn M. Sulmasy

U.S. Coast Guard Academy ( email )

15 Mohegan Avenue
New London, CT 06320
United States

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