Market Reform, Regional Energy and Popular Representation: Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia

Posted: 1 Jul 2008

See all articles by Theocharis Grigoriadis

Theocharis Grigoriadis

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics

Benno Torgler

Queensland University of Technology; CREMA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: November 18, 2007

Abstract

This article investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the energy voting choices of State Duma deputies between 1994 and 2003, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We apply Poole's optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy market reform in the first decade of Russia's democratic transition. Our main finding is that the gas production factor is intertemporally important in the formation of the deputies' legislative choices and shows Gazprom's strategic position in the post-Soviet Russian economy. The oil production factor is variably significant in the two first Dumas, when the main legislative debates on oil privatization occur. The energy committee membership tends to consistently explain pro-reform voting choices. The pro-and anti-reform poles observed in our Poole-based single dimensional scale are not necessarily connected with liberal and state-oriented policies respectively.

Keywords: energy regulation, market reform, energy resources, roll call votes, legislative politics, State Duma, Russia

JEL Classification: Q40, D72, K23, P27, P37, P31, R11

Suggested Citation

Grigoriadis, Theocharis and Torgler, Benno, Market Reform, Regional Energy and Popular Representation: Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia (November 18, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1031029

Theocharis Grigoriadis (Contact Author)

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

Boltzmannstrasse 20
D-14195 Berlin, 14195
Germany

Benno Torgler

Queensland University of Technology ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

CREMA

Gellertstrasse 18
Basel
Zurich, CH 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
381
PlumX Metrics