Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently

15 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2007 Last revised: 26 Jan 2012

Date Written: November 15, 2007


I study a market where agents with jointly owned heterogeneous goods trade subject to the constraint that each agent ends up with one good. In this market the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.

Keywords: Efficient mechanisms, multidimensional information, multi-object auctions

JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82, L14

Suggested Citation

Yenmez, M. Bumin, Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently (November 15, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1031272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031272

M. Bumin Yenmez (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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