Median Stable Matching for Markets with Wages

32 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2008 Last revised: 12 Apr 2011

See all articles by Michael Schwarz

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 22, 2009

Abstract

We define the median stable matching for two sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it exists.

Keywords: Assignment game, core, labor market, market design

JEL Classification: C71, C78

Suggested Citation

Schwarz, Michael and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Median Stable Matching for Markets with Wages (January 22, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1031277 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031277

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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