Corporate Fraud, Self-Fulfilling Optimism, and Industry-Wide Over-Investment

45 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2007 Last revised: 20 Mar 2008

See all articles by Nisan Langberg

Nisan Langberg

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management

Praveen Kumar

University of Houston - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 18, 2008

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a theory of industry-wide over capacity and optimism among rational investors based on the manipulation of investors' beliefs by insiders. We analyze a dynamic model of corporate fraud, where manipulation and consequent investment distortions occur in equilibrium. Industry-wide over capacity and optimism emerge when manipulation by one firm promotes manipulation by other firms in the industry. This dynamic externality occurs because managers are more likely to over-state performance when market expectations on productivity are high; for example, following favorable past managerial disclosures by other firms in the industry. This externality can lead to industry-wide manipulation and a run-up in market expectations that converge to optimistic beliefs and high levels of investment. Alternatively, if there is no such run-up, investors' expectations converge to firms' true productivity, i.e., there is complete learning. Our model therefore exhibits a stochastic learning equilibrium: under certain conditions, this equilibrium produces complete learning on the firms' productivity in the limit; and, under other conditions, there is herding around optimistic beliefs about this productivity. By contrast, in most of the herding literature, informational cascades eventually occur with certainty and herding is symmetric. They do not therefore explain why some industries are more susceptible to investor optimism or overcapacity than others. In particular, we clarify that a run-up in market expectations and investment is more likely when the cost of capital is low, there is more uncertainty regarding industry productivity, the agency conflict with management is severe, and firms' growth potential is high. We also show that the possibility of manipulation by insiders induces excessive persistence in investment and find that downward movements in markets' expectations can be abrupt relative to upward movements.

Keywords: Asymmetric information, Managerial incentives, Learning, Investment

JEL Classification: G32, D23

Suggested Citation

Langberg, Nisan and Kumar, Praveen, Corporate Fraud, Self-Fulfilling Optimism, and Industry-Wide Over-Investment (March 18, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1031720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031720

Nisan Langberg (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management ( email )

Tel Aviv
Israel

Praveen Kumar

University of Houston - Department of Finance ( email )

Houston, TX 77204
United States
713-743-4770 (Phone)
713-743-4789 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
189
Abstract Views
1,354
Rank
185,097
PlumX Metrics