Ex Post Liability for Harm Vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment

Posted: 23 Nov 2007

See all articles by Christian Ewerhart

Christian Ewerhart

University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that exclusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can correct these inefficiencies. We complete their argument by making a mild additional premise.

Suggested Citation

Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W., Ex Post Liability for Harm Vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment. American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1031972

Christian Ewerhart

University of Zurich, Department of Economics ( email )

Schoenberggasse 1
Zurich, CH-8001
Switzerland

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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