Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

9 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2007

See all articles by Stephanie Rosenkranz

Stephanie Rosenkranz

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

Suggested Citation

Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W., Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts. Economics Letters, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1032130

Stephanie Rosenkranz

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
+31 30 253 9806 (Phone)
+31 30 253 7373 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/defaculteit/persoonlijkepagi/rosenkranz/

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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